Incentive schemes as strategic variables: An application to a mixed duopoly
Author:
- Fátima BarrosFBFátima Barros
- 1 September 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 13 (3) , 373-386
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This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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