IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION THROUGH INFLATION TARGETING
- 1 February 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 12 (S1) , 45-59
Abstract
This paper presents a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with imperfect competition and nominal price rigidities in which productivity shocks coexist with markup shocks. After analyzing the features of the optimal cooperative solution, we show that this allocation can be implemented in a strategic context through inflation-targeting regimes. Under these regimes, each monetary authority minimizes a quadratic loss function that targets only domestic targets, namely, GDP inflation and the output gap.Keywords
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