Topology Learning Aided False Data Injection Attack without Prior Topology Information
Authors:
- 26 July 2021
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-5
Abstract
False Data Injection (FDI) attacks against power system state estimation are a growing concern for operators. Previously, most works on FDI attacks have been performed under the assumption of the attacker having full knowledge of the underlying system without clear justification. In this paper, we develop a topology-learning-aided FDI attack that allows stealthy cyber-attacks against AC power system state estimation without prior knowledge of system information. The attack combines topology learning technique, based only on branch and bus power flows, and attacker-side pseudo-residual assessment to perform stealthy FDI attacks with high confidence. This paper, for the first time, demonstrates how quickly the attacker can develop full-knowledge of the grid topology and parameters and validates the full knowledge assumptions in the previous work.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
- False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A SurveyIEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 2016
- Analyzing Locally Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks for Undetectable Line OutagesIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2016
- Masking Transmission Line Outages via False Data Injection AttacksIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2016
- Blind False Data Injection Attack Using PCA Approximation Method in Smart GridIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2015
- Parameter Estimation of Multiterminal Transmission Lines Using Joint PMU and SCADA DataIEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 2014
- Identification of power distribution network topology via voltage correlation analysis2013
- Vulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-AttacksIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2012
- Stealth false data injection using independent component analysis in smart grid2011
- False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power gridsACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2011
- MATPOWER: Steady-State Operations, Planning, and Analysis Tools for Power Systems Research and EducationIEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2010