Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
Author:
- Vianney DequiedtVDVianney Dequiedt
- 1 September 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 136 (1) , 302-323
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
- Robustly Collusion-Proof ImplementationEconometrica, 2006
- The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and IntermediationEconometrica, 2004
- Mechanism Design with Collusion and CorrelationEconometrica, 2000
- Multi-dimensional screening:European Economic Review, 1999
- Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber SalesJournal of Political Economy, 1997
- Collusion Under Asymmetric InformationEconometrica, 1997
- Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement AuctionsJournal of Political Economy, 1993
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous biddersGames and Economic Behavior, 1991
- Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English AuctionsJournal of Political Economy, 1987
- Incentives and incomplete informationJournal of Public Economics, 1979