Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?
Author:
- Alan HájekAHAlan Hájek
- 1 December 2008
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 59 (4) , 793-819
Abstract
Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned.Keywords
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