The Strategic Context of Congressional Party Leadership

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Abstract
This article presents an argument that the dominant scholarly approach to studying congressional party leadership&generally referred to as principal-agent theory&should be redirected to better account for the strategic context within which leaders operate. We begin with a discussion of six related themes, which we believe capture major limitations in existing leadership studies. To further our argument, we then analyze the role of party leadership on two recent legislative initiatives&the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (S. 652) and the Kennedy-Kassebaum Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (H.R. 3103). Based on interviews with top leadership and committee staff, we explore in depth the strategies employed by House and Senate party leaders at each stage of the legislative process on these measures. We conclude with summary observations about the importance of developing a fully strategic theory of congressional party leadership, especially for analyzing leadership behavior within the narrow partisan majorities of the 106th Congress.