Property rights and the political organization of agriculture
Authors:
- Jonathan H. ConningJCJonathan H. Conning
- James A. RobinsonJRJames A. Robinson
- 1 March 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 82 (2) , 416-447
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
- Getting Institutions “Right” for Whom? Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of InvestmentAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2003
- Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West BengalJournal of Political Economy, 2002
- A Theory of Political TransitionsAmerican Economic Review, 2001
- Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growthJournal of Development Economics, 2000
- Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from IndiaThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000
- Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from Colombia, Brazil and South AfricaWorld Development, 1999
- Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from GhanaJournal of Political Economy, 1995
- Occupational Choice and the Process of DevelopmentJournal of Political Economy, 1993
- A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government DebtReview of Economic Studies, 1990
- Agricultural Development and Land Tenancy in a Peasant Economy: A Theoretical and Empirical AnalysisAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1979