Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care
Authors:
Open Access
- 1 September 2000
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 90 (4) , 1055-1071
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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