Corruption in College Basketball? Evidence of Tanking in Postseason Conference Tournaments
Authors:
- 1 February 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 19-38
Abstract
This article observes that regular-season champions in National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) men’s basketball often perform poorly in season-ending conference tournaments and examines two alternative explanations for this underperformance. We employ data on regular-season champions during the period 1990-2004 to test between competing models of “tanking” motivated by (a) fitness saving for the NCAA tournament and (b) a form of corruption. Our empirical results confirm that systematic under-performance does occur and indicate that corruption is a likely motivation.Keywords
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