A study of group lending and incentives in Bolivia
- 1 July 2000
- journal article
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Social Economics
- Vol. 27 (7/8/9/10) , 927-943
Abstract
Documents a case study of an urban group lending programme run by the bank BancoSol in La Paz, Bolivia. The lending programme has proved capable of sustaining a set of widely accessible lending relations with a large number of self‐employed microentrepreneurs in Bolivia. In documenting this programme, our aim is to contrast several features of BancoSol’s group lending policies against some of the theoretical results that have emerged from the microeconomic modelling research on group loan contracts. This exercise is based in part on a small survey that was conducted among BancoSol’s client borrowers.Keywords
This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
- Group lending under asymmetric informationJournal of Development Economics, 1999
- Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateralJournal of Development Economics, 1995
- The Economics of Rural OrganizationSouthern Economic Journal, 1995
- Hayami, Yujiro, and Keijiro Otsuka. The Economics of Contract Choice: An Agrarian Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, xi + 209 pp., $@@‐@@45American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1994
- ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND MODELS OF CREDIT RATIONINGBulletin of Economic Research, 1993
- Obstacles to Developing Indigenous Small and Medium Enterprises: An Empirical AssessmentThe World Bank Economic Review, 1993
- Peer Monitoring and Credit MarketsThe World Bank Economic Review, 1990
- Introduction: Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets—Puzzles and Policy PerspectivesThe World Bank Economic Review, 1990
- Small Manufacturing Enterprises in Developing CountriesThe World Bank Economic Review, 1987
- Urban Employment and the Labor Market in Developing NationsEconomic Development and Cultural Change, 1985