Partially observable game-theoretic agent programming in Golog
Authors:
- Alberto FinziAFAlberto Finzi
- Thomas LukasiewiczTLThomas Lukasiewicz
- 1 April 2020
- journal article
- conference paper
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
- Vol. 119, 220-241
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Austrian Science Fund (P18146-N04)
- REFILLS (H2020-ICT-731590)
- ICOSAF (2014–2020)
- DFG
- EPSRC (EP/N510129/1)
- AXA Research Fund
- EPSRC (EP/R013667/1, EP/L012138/1, EP/M025268/1)
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