Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret Testing
Preprint
- 1 January 2004
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converKeywords
All Related Versions
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