Tracking the Real: Through Thick and Thin
- 1 September 2004
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 55 (3) , 393-409
Abstract
In this paper, I examine Azzouni's tracking requirement and its use as a normative constraint on theories about objects which we take as real. I focus on what he calls ‘thick epistemic access’ and argue that there is a logical–conceptual sense in which thick access to the real presupposes thin access to it. Then, I move on to advance an alternative—Sellarsian—way to ontic commitment and show that (a) it is better than Azzouni's, and (b) it can accommodate thick epistemic access as a bonus. Finally, I try to defend the Quinean theoretical virtues against some of Azzouni's objections.Keywords
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