Voting, the Symmetric Group, and Representation Theory
Authors:
- Zajj DaughertyZDZajj Daugherty
- Alexander K. EustisAEAlexander K. Eustis
- Gregory MintonGMGregory Minton
- Michael E. OrrisonMOMichael E. Orrison
- 1 October 2009
- journal article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Mathematical Monthly
- Vol. 116 (8) , 667-687
Abstract
We show how voting may be viewed naturally from an algebraic perspective by viewing voting profiles as elements of certain well-studied $\mathbb{Q}S_n$-modules. By using only a handful of simple combinatorial objects (e.g., tabloids) and some basic ideas from representation theory (e.g., Schur's Lemma), this allows us to recast and extend some well-known results in the field of voting theory.Keywords
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