Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom
- 1 February 2009
- journal article
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Perspectives
- Vol. 23 (1) , 43-55
Abstract
Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts.Keywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?☆Journal of Financial Economics, 2008
- Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?Academy of Management Perspectives, 2008
- Myths and Realities of Executive Pay2007
- Pay without PerformanceAcademy of Management Perspectives, 2006
- Executive Compensation as an Agency ProblemJournal of Economic Perspectives, 2003
- Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performanceJournal of Financial Economics, 1999
- Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job DesignThe Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991
- Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processesStrategic Management Journal, 1989
- Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. TheoryThe Journal of Finance, 1988
- On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.Academy of Management Journal, 1975