Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. Approximation
Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 641-665
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- NSF (National Science Foundation) (CCF-2441071)
- United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF: 2021655, NSF: 2127781)
- Israel Science Foundation (533/23)
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