Market signaling: An example of a two-person decision problem with dynamic information structure
Authors:
- M. KastnerMKM. Kastner
- 1 April 1978
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 23 (2) , 350-361
Abstract
An economic model of the job market is formulated as a two-person decision problem with dynamic information structure. The role of the decentralized information is investigated in terms of finding equilibrium solutions and properties of these solutions, such as stability, multiple solutions, and threshold effects of signaling cost and noise.Keywords
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