Abstract
This article focuses on the security challenges in cyber–physical systems (CPSs), emphasizing actuator false data injection attacks. Current postdetection frameworks detect anomalies only after compromised control signals are input into the system and cannot be employed directly at the actuator’s end due to the unavailable innovation. To address this, we introduce a control signal predetection framework by a multistep-ahead prediction method, where a remote estimator engages in multistep state predictions after calculating the current-time state estimate. Subsequently, the controller formulates a multistep control strategy and transmits it to the actuator for execution. In light of this architecture, we have devised a detector on the actuator’s side to identify potential threats originating from actuator attacks. Furthermore, we undertake an in-depth analysis to characterize the consequential impacts of various attack patterns on the estimation performance, considering the presence of the proposed detector. Simulations are provided to represent and validate our findings visually.
Funding Information
  • Liaoning Provincial Department of Science and Technology (2025-BS-0350)
  • Liaoning Provincial Department of Science and Technology (2025-MSLH-590)
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (62533008)
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (62394342)
  • Scientific Research Innovation Capability Support Project for Young Faculty

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