Institutional Investors' Representativeness and Earnings Management
- 1 January 2021
- book chapter
- Published by IGI Global Scientific Publishing
- p. 27-45
Abstract
In contexts characterized by high ownership concentration, institutional investors may lose their monitoring role and might not be effective in constraining earnings management. So, this study investigates whether directors appointed by institutional shareholders are more effective in inhibiting earnings management for companies with a high ownership concentration, rather than the mere presence of institutional investors. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, findings suggest a negative relationship between minority directors appointed by institutional shareholders and abnormal accruals, while no relationship is found between the latter and the mere presence of institutional investors. Moreover, results also highlight that the difference between strategic and no strategic institutional investors does not count in a context characterized by high ownership concentration. Overall, this study suggests that institutional investors, regardless of their characteristics, are more effective in constraining earnings management when they can count on an agent on the board of directors.Keywords
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