The Birth and Death of Taxes: A Hypothesis
Authors:
- 1 March 1977
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 37 (1) , 161-178
Abstract
Tax systems in England, France, Spain, and Venice are regarded as providing payments from subjects to governments for protection against foreign and domestic threats. In each developing state, the supply and demand for protection at the time of the tax system's origin determined the long-term character of taxation. Only where taxes arose in an environment of exceptionally long wars did subjects forfeit their right to control levies. Groups having close substitutes available for central government paid non-extortionate taxes. Collusion in the supply of protection led to noble tax privileges. Once created, taxes survived as long as the government itself.Keywords
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