Contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting
Authors:
- Corinne AlexanderCACorinne Alexander
- Rasto IvanicRIRasto Ivanic
- Stephanie RoschSRStephanie Rosch
- Wallace TynerWTWallace Tyner
- Steven Y. WuSWSteven Y. Wu
- Joshua R. YoderJYJoshua R. Yoder
- 1 July 2012
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 34 (4) , 970-979
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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