Virtue Ethics, Dialogue, and “Reverence”
Author:
- 1 December 2003
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Behavioral Scientist
- Vol. 47 (4) , 442-458
Abstract
Contemporary theorizing about virtue in philosophy and social theory broadly includes not only virtue ethics but stimulating new perspectives on dialogue and fresh thinking about implacable human limitations. Taken together, these ideas outline a credible alternative to dogmatism, objectivism, and relativism in a pluralistic modern context. They also offer promising leads for rethinking social inquiry in such a context for an approach to inquiry that, in Alasdair Mac Intyre’s words, allows us to affirm “moral pluralism without moral relativism.”Keywords
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
- Gadamer on the Human Sciences2002
- Within, outside, and in between: The relational unconscious.Psychoanalytic Psychology, 2000
- Toward a Dialogical SelfAmerican Behavioral Scientist, 1998
- Interpretive Social ScienceAmerican Behavioral Scientist, 1998
- Toward a theoretical psychology: Should a subdiscipline be formally recognized?American Psychologist, 1997
- The dialogical self: Beyond individualism and rationalism.American Psychologist, 1992
- Why the self is empty: Toward a historically situated psychology.American Psychologist, 1990
- And what is the public interest?American Psychologist, 1986
- Human Agency and Language1985
- Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of ScienceThe Monist, 1977