A structural model of competing sellers: Auctions and posted prices
Author:
- Robert G. HammondRHRobert G. Hammond
- 1 May 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 60, 52-68
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
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