Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market
Author:
- 1 February 2008
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 32 (1) , 35-52
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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