Parliaments and government termination: understanding the confidence relationship
- 17 November 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 45 (3) , 455-469
Abstract
The core feature of a parliamentary system is not that governments tend to emerge from the legislatures in some way or another, but their political responsibility to this body. While in only some parliamentary systems the government needs formal support of parliament in order to take office, in all parliamentary systems no government can survive against the will of parliament. The academic literature related to the rules for how governments form is vast. Strikingly, scholars have paid far less attention to unpacking the core institution of parliamentary systems of government – the confidence relationship and the various no confidence procedures. Placing the focus on how the parliament can hold the government accountable, this special issue assesses the larger influences legislative confidence has on executive–legislative relations, and improves our understanding of the ways in which the executive may be challenged or dismissed.Keywords
Funding Information
- Israel Science Foundation (242/16)
This publication has 51 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre‐election Coalitions and Portfolio AllocationsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 2007
- Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial DemocraciesInternational Political Science Review, 2003
- GOVERNMENT TERMINATIONAnnual Review of Political Science, 2003
- Strategic Parliamentary DissolutionAmerican Political Science Review, 2002
- Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democraciesEuropean Journal of Political Research, 2000
- Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministersEuropean Journal of Political Research, 2000
- MODELS OF GOVERNMENT FORMATIONAnnual Review of Political Science, 1998
- Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary ElectionsAmerican Political Science Review, 1995
- A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary DemocraciesAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1990
- Contending Models of Cabinet StabilityAmerican Political Science Review, 1988