An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
Authors:
- Dieter BalkenborgDBDieter Balkenborg
- Miltiadis MakrisMMMiltiadis Makris
Open Access
- 1 May 2015
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 157, 918-958
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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