The economics of quasi-integration
Author:
- 1 January 1994
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of Political Economy
- Vol. 6 (1) , 1-18
Abstract
This paper presents an economic analysis of quasi-integration i.e., enduring relationships between legally separate economic units. Two frameworks are presented based on, respectively, transaction costs and what is called competitive dynamics. It is argued that the transaction cost framework has difficulties in accounting for the recent development of quasi-integration strategies. The preferred competitive dynamics approach means that transaction costs can be reformulated to become entry/exit barriers for networks of firms.Keywords
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