How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax-Base Restrictions
Author:
- 1 February 2005
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 95 (1) , 314-346
Abstract
This paper studies how to protect future generations from expropriation and to induce optimal investment in intergenerational public goods (IPGs), by introducing constitutional restrictions on the tax base. The type of tax-base restrictions that we consider places limits on the tax instruments that the government can use to raise revenue, but not on the level of expenditures or debt. We show that the introduction of a constitutional amendment requiring that IPGs and debt be financed with land taxes makes intergenerational expropriation impossible and, for many cases of interest, induces optimal investment in IPGs. We also show that a weaker constitutional amendment requiring that IPGs be financed with land taxes, but imposing no restrictions on how to finance the debt, has a positive impact on IPGs, but not on expropriation. The paper also studies the political feasibility of these reforms. We show that the first reform is not politically feasible since it hurts current generations, but the weaker reform can induce a Pareto improvement.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment?American Economic Review, 2003
- Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and EvidenceJournal of Political Economy, 1997
- The incentive effects of property taxes on local governmentsPublic Choice, 1996
- Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded IndebtednessThe Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1996
- Capital budgets, borrowing rules, and state capital spendingJournal of Public Economics, 1995
- Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the StatesAmerican Political Science Review, 1994
- State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and PoliticsJournal of Political Economy, 1994
- SOME INEFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF GENERATIONAL POLITICS AND EXCHANGE*Economics & Politics, 1993
- The Surprising Incidence of a Tax on Pure Rent: A New Answer to an Old QuestionJournal of Political Economy, 1977
- Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit RationingThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976