Bicameralism and Party Politics in Germany: An Empirical Social Choice Analysis
Author:
- 1 August 2001
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 49 (3) , 411-437
Abstract
This paper analyses whether and how party politics transform German bicameralism. Based on the policy positions of bicameral legislators, the study computes the win sets, the yolks of each chamber and a Nash solution in order to analyse empirically the effects of party politics on German bicameralism. In comparison to the basic bicameral model, hypotheses on bicameral conflict and policy stability are tested in the case of similar and different party majorities in the two-dimensional policy space of German labour politics. The results show that party politics transform German bicameralism in two ways. Similar majorities collapse bicameral checks-and-balances, while different party majorities come close to the basic bicameral model with high policy stability and conflict between both chambers.Keywords
This publication has 34 references indexed in Scilit:
- Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party ResponsivenessAmerican Political Science Review, 1999
- The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislatureEuropean Journal of Political Research, 1999
- The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96American Political Science Review, 1999
- Making Votes Count1997
- Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy1995
- Why Parties?1995
- Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the StatesAmerican Political Science Review, 1994
- Bargaining in LegislaturesAmerican Political Science Review, 1989
- A ham sandwich theorem for general measuresSocial Choice and Welfare, 1984
- The Calculus of Consent1960