The `Google Effect' in the FCC's 700 MHz Auction

Authors:
  • SBSandro Brusco
    Sandro Brusco
  • GLGiuseppe Lopomo
    Giuseppe Lopomo
  • LMLeslie M. Marx
    Leslie M. Marx

  • 1 January 2008
Abstract
We describe and interpret bidding behavior in FCC Auction 73 for the C-block licenses. These licenses were initially offered subject to an open platform restriction, which was highly valued by firms such as Google. Google entered bids until its bids reached the C-block reserve price, thereby ensuring that the open platform restriction would be applied to the licenses. Later in the auction, other bidders outbid Google, so Google was able to trigger the open platform restriction without having to purchase any of the licenses. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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