Information in Equity Markets with Ambiguity-Averse Investors
- 27 June 2008
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 22 (9) , 3595-3627
Abstract
This paper shows that persistent mispricing is consistent with a market that includes ambiguity-averse investors. In particular, ambiguity-averse investors may prefer to trade based on aggregate signals that reduce ambiguity at the cost of a loss in information. Equilibrium prices may therefore fail to impound publicly available information. While this creates profit opportunities for ambiguity-neutral investors, ambiguity-averse investors perceive that the benefit of ambiguity reduction outweighs the cost of trading against investors who have superior information. The model can explain both underreaction, such as that evident in postearnings announcement drifts and momentum, and overreaction to accounting accruals.Keywords
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