The Real Effects of Mandatory Nonfinancial Disclosure: Evidence from Supply Chain Transparency
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- 1 November 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (5) , 399-425
Abstract
This paper studies whether and how mandatory nonfinancial disclosure affects firms' real decisions. I exploit a disclosure regulation enacted in California, which mandates that firms disclose how they conduct due diligence to address their suppliers' human rights abuses. I find that treated firms increase their supply chain due diligence, and their suppliers' human rights performance improves following the regulation. The effects are stronger when firms face greater pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and socially conscious shareholders, when customers have greater incentives to use the newly disclosed information, and when the regulation leads to a larger increase in information comparability. Collectively, the results suggest that mandatory nonfinancial disclosure can affect firms' real decisions through market mechanisms and that stakeholder responses play a key role. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G14; G18; G38; J80; K22; K31; K38; L23; M41; M48.Keywords
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