Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games
- 4 April 2006
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 26 (2) , 421-433
Abstract
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This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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