Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?
Preprint
- 1 October 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper examines whether the incidence of earnings management in the UK depends on board monitoring. We focus on two aspects of board monitoring: the role of outside board members and the audit committee. Results indicate that the likelihood of managers making income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting both losses and earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board. Further tests indicate that this association is confined to firms where the separation of corporate ownership and decision control is greatest. In contrast, we find little evidence that outside directors influence income-decreasing abnormal accruals when pre-managed earnings are high. While we are unable to find evidence that the existence of an audit committee directly influences the level of earnings management (either income-increasing or income-decreasing), tests indicate that the monitoring role of outside directors in relation to income-increasing earnings management is more pronounced in cases where an audit committee exists. Our findings suggest that boards contribute towards the integrity of financial statements, as predicted by agency theory.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Detecting earnings management using cross-sectional abnormal accruals modelsAccounting and Business Research, 2000
- Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: Evidence from the UKJournal of Corporate Finance, 1999
- RAW– Rutgers Accounting WebJournal of Business & Finance Librarianship, 1999
- Is Institutional Ownership Associated with Earnings Management and the Extent to which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings?SSRN Electronic Journal, 1999
- The pricing of discretionary accrualsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1996
- Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directorsJournal of Financial Economics, 1996
- Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealthJournal of Financial Economics, 1990
- Voluntary formation of corporate audit committees among NASDAQ firmsJournal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1989
- Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate BehaviorThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1989
- Outside directors and CEO turnoverJournal of Financial Economics, 1988