Finding protocol manipulation attacks
Authors:
Open Access
- 15 August 2011
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 41 (4) , 26-37
Abstract
We develop a method to help discover manipulation attacks in protocol implementations. In these attacks, adversaries induce honest nodes to exhibit undesirable behaviors by misrepresenting their intent or network conditions. Our method is based on a novel combination of static analysis with symbolic execution and dynamic analysis with concrete execution. The former finds code paths that are likely vulnerable, and the latter emulates adversarial actions that lead to effective attacks. Our method is precise (i.e., no false positives) and we show that it scales to complex protocol implementations. We apply it to four diverse protocols, including TCP, the 802.11 MAC, ECN, and SCTP, and show that it is able to find all manipulation attacks that have been previously reported for these protocols. We also find a previously unreported attack for SCTP. This attack is a variant of a TCP attack but must be mounted differently in SCTP because of subtle semantic differences between the two protocols.Keywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Inputs of Coma: Static Detection of Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities2009
- Towards Generating High Coverage Vulnerability-Based Signatures with Protocol-Level Constraint-Guided ExplorationLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2009
- Automatic Patch-Based Exploit Generation is Possible: Techniques and Implications2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP 2008), 2008
- Bouncer2007
- CUTEACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, 2005
- DART2005
- Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the networkACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 2002
- Extended static checking for Java2002
- TCP congestion control with a misbehaving receiverACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 1999
- Symbolic execution and program testingCommunications of the ACM, 1976