A synergy of punishment and extortion in cooperation dilemmas driven by the leader
Authors:
- JunFang WangJWJunFang Wang
- JinLi GuoJGJinLi Guo
- 1 February 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 119, 263-268
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71571119, 71801139)
- Foundation of Henan Educational Committee (2019-ZDJH-116)
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