The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform
Authors:
- Scott GehlbachSGScott Gehlbach
- Edmund J. MaleskyEMEdmund J. Malesky
- 1 October 2010
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 72 (4) , 957-975
Abstract
Contrary to the conventional understanding that reform is more difficult when veto players are numerous, we show formally that veto players may encourage policy change by weakening the power of spe...Keywords
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