Contrasting effects of information sharing on common-pool resource extraction behavior: Experimental findings
Open Access
- 7 October 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 15 (10) , e0240212
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different information sharing mechanisms in a common-pool resource game, with a view to finding a mechanism that is both efficient and inexpensive for the managing agency. More precisely, we compare the observed extraction levels produced as a result of three mechanisms: a mandatory information sharing mechanism and two voluntary information sharing mechanisms that differ in the degree of freedom given to the players. Our main result is that a voluntary information sharing mechanism could help in reaching a lower average extraction level than that observed with the mandatory mechanism.Keywords
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