Abstract
Corruption in Latin American public institutions persists as a structural problem that weakens the rule of law, erodes public trust, distorts public spending, and limits the state’s capacity to provide essential services. This study aimed to analyze the relationship between corruption and legal oversight mechanisms in Latin American public institutions, considering their regulatory configuration, implementation capacity, and observable institutional effects. A qualitative, exploratory, documentary, and cross-sectional approach was applied, based on a bibliographic review of scientific literature, academic books, technical reports, and legal documents related to transparency, auditing, public procurement, accountability, and administrative sanctions. The findings show that the region has relatively broad anti-corruption legal frameworks; however, their effectiveness is limited by the gap between regulatory design and institutional implementation, weak technical professionalization, fragmented oversight, and insufficient coordination among transparency, auditing, and sanctioning mechanisms. The discussion highlights that legal oversight becomes effective only when it forms integrated chains of prevention, detection, exposure, sanction, reparation, and institutional learning. It is concluded that combating corruption requires moving from declarative legality toward verifiable institutional operation capable of reducing impunity and strengthening public legitimacy.

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