Capacity of the EM Covert/Side-Channel Created by the Execution of Instructions in a Processor
Authors:
Open Access
- 13 October 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 13 (3) , 605-620
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to answer how much information is “transmitted” by the execution of particular sequence of instructions in a processor. Introducing such a measure would provide quantitative guidance for designing programs and computer hardware that minimizes inadvertent (side channel) information leakage, and would also help detect parts of a program or hardware design that have unusually high leakage (i.e., were designed to function as covert channel “transmitters”). To answer this question, we propose a new method to estimate the maximum information leakage through EM signals generated by the execution of instructions in a processor. We start by deriving a mathematical relationship between electromagnetic side-channel energy of individual instructions and the measured pairwise side-channel signal power. Then, we use this measure to calculate the transition probabilities needed for estimating capacity. Finally, we propose a new method to estimate side/covert channel capacity created by the execution of instructions in a processor and illustrate our results in several computer systems.Keywords
Funding Information
- NSF (1563991, 1318934)
- AFOSR (FA9550-14-1-0223)
- DARPA LADS (FA8650-16-C-7620)
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