Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions? New evidence from preferential trade agreements
- 24 May 2015
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 11 (1) , 89-120
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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