Markets, Transaction Costs and Institutions: Compensating for Nuclear Risk in Japan
Author:
- 1 March 2003
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 38 (1) , 5-23
Abstract
This article explores the nature, role and effectiveness of compensation mechanisms in managing the political constraints to the siting or development of nuclear projects in Japan. Statistical analysis reveals that the relationship between compensation and income is a key dynamic characterising the history of the marketplace for nuclear facilities in Japan. The commodification and trading of risks for benefits is governed by a sophisticated institutional and policy framework which acts to lower the transaction costs of market exchange. The interaction between the market and the institutional dynamic has generated a curious pattern of both NIMBY ('not in my backyard') and YIMBY ('yes, in my backyard') responses to nuclear development in Japan.Keywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Why Protest?Policy Studies Journal, 1995
- Incentives Policies to Site Hazardous Waste FacilitiesRisk Analysis, 1991
- InstitutionsJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1991
- The Business of the Japanese State1987
- LP/HC and LULUs: The Political Uses of Risk Analysis in Land‐Use Planning1Risk Analysis, 1983
- Direct Experience And Attitude-Behavior Consistency1981