Margaret Cavendish on Perception, Self‐Knowledge, and Probable Opinion
Author:
- 7 July 2015
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 10 (7) , 438-450
Abstract
Scholarly interest in Margaret Cavendish's philosophical views has steadily increased over the past decade, but her epistemology has received little attention, and no consensus has emerged; Cavendish has been characterized as a skeptic, as a rationalist, as presenting an alternative epistemology to both rationalism and empiricism, and even as presenting no clear theory of knowledge at all. This paper concludes that Cavendish was only a modest skeptic, for she believed that humans can achieve knowledge through sensitive and rational perception as well as through self‐knowledge and can form probable opinions through reasoning.Keywords
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