Corporate governance, CEO compensation and tax aggressiveness
- 14 November 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Review of Accounting and Finance
- Vol. 15 (4) , 445-462
Abstract
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of corporate governance structure and CEO compensation on the level of tax aggressiveness. Design/methodology/approach: This work analyzes a sample of 471 observations of 100 companies listed on the NASDAQ 100 for the period 2008-2012. It uses a fixed-effect panel model to analyze the effect of different model variables on the tax aggressiveness level. Findings: The main finding of this study is the great influence of corporate governance structure and CEO compensation on reducing tax aggressiveness. Indeed, it finds a significant negative relation between board size, CEO salary, CEO stock options and tax aggressiveness. In addition, the study reveals that there is a direct negative relation between CEO duality, tax fees and tax aggressiveness. Research limitations/implications: The study was conducted using robust methods to test the effect of corporate governance structure and CEO compensation on tax aggressiveness level. The generalized least squares method was used to fit panel data and overcome heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. The aim of the study was to prove the great effect of both corporate governance structure and CEO compensation on reducing tax aggressiveness. As this study was based on data from American companies, the results cannot be generalized to all contexts. Originality/value: This paper differs from previous work and tests the effect of corporate governance structure, CEO compensation, CEO characteristics and audit fees on tax aggressiveness. The findings of this study will enrich the literature on tax aggressiveness by suggesting that corporate governance structure and CEO compensation can significantly limit tax aggressiveness behavior. Therefore, shareholders must be aware of these two variables. They need to limit tax aggressiveness behavior, as it is usually accompanied by rent diversion, as reported by Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Therefore, these findings will be helpful to investors, managers and regulators because they have implications for the interactive decision-making process.Keywords
This publication has 32 references indexed in Scilit:
- Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidanceJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2015
- The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contractingJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2010
- Fair value accounting and gains from asset securitizations: A convenient earnings management tool with compensation side-benefitsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2010
- Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?Journal of Financial Economics, 2010
- Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial ReportingThe Accounting Review, 2009
- Long-Run Corporate Tax AvoidanceThe Accounting Review, 2008
- Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Impact of the 2002 Governance RulesThe Journal of Finance, 2007
- Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: An empirical analysisJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2007
- Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentivesJournal of Financial Economics, 2006
- The Link Between Earnings Timeliness, Earnings Conservatism and Board Composition: evidence from the UKCorporate Governance: An International Review, 2004