Resource-constrained spatial public-goods games with effective cooperation and frozen dynamics
- 1 November 2026
- journal article
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 36 (11)
Abstract
Spatial public-goods models often measure cooperation by strategy frequency while assuming continued access to interactions and strategy updating. In practice, organizing collective activities requires resources: community-managed water systems, for example, need maintenance funds to sustain service provision. Motivated by these constraints and conceptually inspired by dissipative structures, we propose an organizer-mediated spatial public-goods game to examine how resource constraints on game organization and strategy updating shape overall and non-frozen cooperation. In this model, accumulated resources govern local game organization and evolve through public-goods returns, contribution, metabolic, and organizational costs, and commission-based redistribution between organizers and participants. When all post-settlement resource balances in a prescribed neighborhood are negative, the focal player’s own strategy updating is suspended while its strategy is retained, allowing nominal cooperation to persist despite the loss of updating eligibility. We measure overall cooperation, effective cooperation (non-frozen cooperators as a fraction of the population), freezing, and cooperation within the non-frozen population. Across parameter scans and complementary analyses, resource constraints produce a marked gap between nominal and effective cooperation. Cooperation gains promote system-wide activation, while metabolic costs dissipate resources and organizational costs make local interactions harder to sustain. Commission has a non-monotonic effect: moderate extraction can stabilize active cooperative cores, but excessive extraction limits their expansion. Together, these results show how resource accumulation and allocation shape the organization of interactions and the updating of strategies, highlighting why strategy abundance alone is insufficient to assess cooperation.Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (62366057)
- Practice Innovation Project of Postgraduate Students in the Professional Degree of Yunnan University (ZC-262615014)
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