Accountable certificate management using undeniable attestations
Open Access
- 1 November 2000
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 2000, 9-17
Abstract
This paper initiates a study of accountable certificate management methods, necessary to support long-term authenticity of digital doc- uments. Our main contribution is a model for accountable certifi- cate management, where clients receive attestations confi rming in- clusion/removal of their certificates from the database of valid cer- tifi cates. We explain why accountability depends on the inability of the third parties to create contradictory attestations. After that we define an undeniable attester as a primitive that provides effi- cient attestation creation, publishing and verifi cation, so that it is intractable to create contradictory attestations. We introduce au- thenticated search trees and build an effi cient undeniable attester upon them. The proposed system is the fi rst accountable long-term certificate management system. Moreover, authenticated search trees can be used in many security-critical applications instead of the (sorted) hash trees to reduce trust in the authorities, without decrease in efficienc y. Therefore, the undeniable attester promises looks like a very useful cryptographic primitive with a wide range of applications.Keywords
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