The article is devoted to the study of abstraction as a fundamental method of cognition in law and its role in the formation of legal constructions in conjunction with the process of concretization. It is substantiated that abstraction in law is inherently linked to the process opposite in its orientation—concretization—together forming a unified cognitive-constructive mechanism of legal thinking. It is demonstrated that abstraction not only ensures the generalization of legal material but also serves as a tool for constructing legal reality, whereas concretization enables the adaptation of general legal models to the conditions of specific life situations. It is shown that legal concepts, norms, and institutions are the result of a purposeful selection and generalization of the essential features of legal phenomena, as well as their further concretization in the process of law application. The interrelation between the abstract and the concrete in law is analyzed through the prism of the functioning of legal norms, judicial practice, and the mechanism of legal regulation as a whole. It is argued that the effectiveness of legal regulation depends on an optimal balance between the level of abstraction of legal constructions and their ability to adequately reflect social reality in the process of law application. Special attention is given to the role of concretization as a tool for overcoming excessive abstraction of legal norms, particularly through the interpretative activity of courts and the development of law enforcement practice. The functions of abstraction and concretization in the processes of law-making and law application are identified, as well as their significance for ensuring legal certainty, predictability, and the effectiveness of law. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the role of abstraction and concretization as interrelated instruments of legal construction and to reveal their functional significance in legal cognition, law-making, and law application.