A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?
- 1 January 2014
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 81 (1) , 138-153
Abstract
In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism’s submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism’s parts should have some influence on the phenomena the mechanism brings about. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach taking (i) and (ii) into account.Keywords
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