Multi-provider service negotiation and contracting in network virtualization
Authors:
- 1 January 2010
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 15421201,p. 471-478
Abstract
Network virtualization environment (VNE) affords great business flexibility to the customers and the providers as multiple providers can jointly support a customer's virtual network. Under the current network model, a group of Infrastructure Providers (InPs) peer with each other to provide a packaged deal. Such a business arrangement is not customer-driven, does not promote fair market competition and does not ensure cost minimization. Furthermore, the on-demand nature of virtual networks requires efficient and automated service negotiation and contracting. In this paper, we present V-Mart. To the InPs, V-Mart offers an environment to participate in a faithful and fair competition over the VN resources; and to the SPs, it offers a customer-driven virtual resource partitioning and contracting engine. V-Mart uses a two-stage Vickrey auction model that is strategy-proof, flexible to diverse InP pricing models, and functions over heterogenous multi-commodity market that characterizes the NVE. Through analysis and simulation we show the flexibility and effectiveness of V-Mart.Keywords
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