Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division

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Abstract
Several resource allocation settings involve agents with unequal entitlements represented by weights. We analyze weighted fair division from an asymptotic perspective: if m items are divided among n agents whose utilities are independently sampled from a probability distribution, when is it likely that a fair allocation exist? We show that if the ratio between the weights is bounded, a weighted envy-free allocation exists with high probability provided that m = Omega(n log n / log log n), generalizing a prior unweighted result. For weighted proportionality, we establish a sharp threshold of m = n / (1 - \mu) for the transition from non-existence to existence, where \mu in (0,1) denotes the mean of the distribution. In addition, we prove that for two agents, a weighted envy-free (and weighted proportional) allocation is likely to exist if m = omega(sqrt{r}), where r denotes the ratio between the two weights.

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